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Countries 211. Introduction*
In the Single European Act of 1987 the member countries of the
European Community have committed themselves to complete the
single market by the end of 1992. The single market is defined
as an area without internal borders granting free movement of
goods, people, services, and capital within this area. The
establishment of a single market was already aimed at when the
European Economic Community was founded in 1957. But only the
customs union was completed by the end of the sixties; in the
seventies, no significant progress was made toward further
economic integration in Europe (Committee for the Study of
Economic and Monetary Union, 1989). One reason for this is
that the harmonization of policies and regulations considered
necessary for establishing a single market proved to be a ra-
ther difficult and time-consuming business and the results,
e.g. in agriculture and steel, were not very encouraging
(Dicke, 1987). Furthermore, in the seventies, the European
economies were struck by low growth and high unemployment;
there was disagreement on the appropriate economic policy res-
ponse and governments increasingly took recourse to putting up
non-tariff trade barriers, in particular against imports from
Southeast Asia, and to granting massive subsidies to ailing as
well as to would-be sunrise industries (e.g. microelectronics
and airbus) in order to protect domestic jobs.
As an economic power, Europe fell behind, especially compared
to the Pacific Rim countries. This was considered as a chal-
lenge calling for political actions (Dicke, 1989a). In June
1985, the European Council of Ministers accepted a White Paper
containing a time table for the creation of the single Euro-
pean market. It includes 279 measures on which the European
* Revised Version of a paper presented at the Cato Institute
on March 22, 1989, Washington, D.C.Commission has to submit proposals which have to be passed by
the Council. According to the Commission, 90 p.c. of the pro-
posals have been submitted to the Council by the end of 1988,
but the Council is somewhat behind schedule, having passed
only 108 proposals (For an economic evaluation of the direc-
tives see Dicke, 1989b). In some important areas proposals
have still not been submitted or there is considerable dis-
agreement on how to proceed with the proposals of the Commis-
sion, e.g. with the harmonization of indirect taxes or with
the introduction of a withholding tax on interest earnings.
Nevertheless, in many areas it has become evident what changes
are to be expected from the completion of the single market.
Companies and banks have started to prepare themselves for the
changing economic environment. The number of cross-border ac-
quisitions and mergers undertaken by firms to improve their
starting position has strongly increased. The pick-up in busi-
ness investment since mid-1987, too, is partly credited to the
restructuring and streamlining efforts of firms in anticipa-
tion of the single market (Grimm, Schatz, Trapp, 1989a).
2. Barriers to Trade Within the EC
Trade within Europe is still hampered by many barriers. The
Commission has identified three types of barriers dividing the
intra-EC-market: physical, technical, and fiscal barriers.
Physical barriers comprise all the red tape and expenses (in-
cluding time forgone) incurred when crossing a border. Tech-
nical barriers are non-tariff trade restrictions and national
regulations, that have a similar trade-hampering effect. The
possibility of applying non-tariff trade restrictions is con-
ceded in Articles 36, 108, 109, and 115 of the Treaty of Rome.
Article 36 allows to restrict the import or the export of cer-
tain goods from or to member countries on the ground of secu-
rity, health, or moral considerations. A typical example forsuch restrictions is the requirement that only such goods may
be imported and sold in the domestic market that are in agree-
ment with the national standards (principle of national
treatment). This practice has been declared unlawful by the
European Court in a number of cases. Although it is stated
that Article 36 should not be applied to discriminate or re-
strict trade, it has been widely exploited for this purpose.
Articles 108, 109 and 115 allow member countries to take
protective measures in the case of balance of payments prob-
lems or to shield themselves from "economic difficulties" cre-
ated by imports. Some member countries have frequently felt
the need to apply these provisions. The actions are mostly
motivated by the intentions to protect jobs, but the cost to
the consumer are rarely assessed. A comparison of car prices
in Italy, France and Germany (Spinanger, 1989) reveals that in
Italy and France, countries with tough restrictions on the
import of Japanese cars, car unit values are significantly
higher than in Germany; prices of Japanese cars sold in Italy
exceed those sold in Germany by up to 40 p.c.
In addition, regulations are frequently used to restrict mar-
ket entry and to control prices and the variety of goods
available to the domestic market (Grimm, Schatz, Trapp 1989b).
In particular, trade in services, e.g. insurances or road and
air traffic, is heavily hindered by regulations. Politically,
the adoption of such regulations is often justified by re-
ferring to national interests or the need to protect consu-
mers. Economically, the argument in favor of government in-
terventions mostly rests on the contention of a market fai-
lure; however, evidence for such failures has not been pre-
sented in any case (Donges, Schatz, 1986). The economic costs
of protection are considerable. A study on the German economy
estimates that under free trade conditions (and an elimination
of all subsidies) the 1986-GNP could have been 6 p.c. and the
employment some 9 p.c. higher than was actually the case (Don-
ges, Schmidt, 1988).An additional barrier to free trade is seen in the widely di-
verging rates of the value-added tax and of some excise taxes
(Table 1). So far in cross-border trade these taxes have been































































levied according to the destination principle (case Al in
table 2). Under this principle the value-added tax is levied
where the goods are consumed; exports are tax-exempt, while
imports are taxed at domestic value-added tax rates (Boss,
1989b). However, without border controls this system can no
longer be enforced because it is not possible to prevent tax-exempted exports from being re-imported. Therefore, in the
single market the value-added tax will be levied on all goods
in the country of origin, regardless of whether they are ex-
ported or consumed at home. Imports continue to be subject to
domestic tax rates but pre-taxes can be deducted. As the do-
mestic VAT-rates apply to all domestic sales the basic feature
of the country of destination principle persists. However, the
distribution of tax revenues between countries changes and
direct imports by consumers will increase. In order to reduce
the incentive for direct imports and to reestablish the old
pattern of tax revenues the Commission has proposed to har-
monize national value-added tax rates within a certain range
and to establish a clearing system based on the registration
of trade between EC-countries (see case A2 in table 2).
3. How Much Tax Harmonization is Needed?
Basically, differences in value-added tax rates or in other
indirect taxes do not constitute a barrier to trade. The rea-
soning behind the drive to harmonize indirect taxation is ra-
ther the expectation that countries with relatively low rates
of indirect taxes will have an "unfair" competitive advantage
and persistent trade surpluses when border controls are abol-
ished and value-added taxation is changed from the country of
destination principle to the country-of-origin principle (from
case Al to case B2 in table 2) . Such a change in taxation
would affect the competitiveness of locations of production
but should not be confused with measures that reduce com-
petition by restricting trade.
With regard to the impact of taxation, differences in national
income taxes and corporate taxes, too ,have a bearing on com-
petitiveness. If the aim were to put up a level playing field
in tax matters it would be necessary to take into account all
taxes affecting business and not only indirect taxes. However,Table 2 - Shaping the Value-Added Taxation in the Single Market
TAXATION OF TRADE
Export country Import country
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tive than in system Al8
the whole issue can be looked upon from another point of view.
Taxes are raised to finance government activities; i.e., the
provision of public goods that should contribute to enhancing
the productivity of the economy. Government involvement in
income distribution, too, has been justified on these grounds.
Redistributional policies are regarded as a means to increase
or to maintain social peace and, thus, to avoid social fric-
tions and disturbances of the production process. Whether the
benefits of more government production of public goods exceed
the costs of higher taxation can best be tested by allowing
free competition between goods produced in high-tax economies
and those supplied by low-tax economies. From this point of
view the harmonization of indirect taxes by a government car-
tel is neither a precondition for the proper functioning of
the single market nor desirable. Competition between economies
with different degrees of government involvement and differ-
ences in the level and structure of taxation can help to iden-
tify the optimal scope of government activity. Countries that
prefer to maintain relatively high tax rates when the single
market is completed will experience a depreciation or - if the
exchange rate is fixed - a loss of reserves. In the end,
value-added-tax-rate differentials are likely to narrow be-
cause governments will tend to imitate more successful compe-
titors. In that respect, the outcome is similar to that of
harmonization by political agreement, but competition in tax
policy will probably lead to a lower EC-wide tax level and
result in less growth of public expenditures than under
harmonization (Boss, 1989).
4. Potential Growth and Employment Gains
As to the economic benefits of the creation of the single mar-
ket, the elimination of physical barriers (border controls)
will free resources for productive purposes. This will provide9
a once-and-for-all increase in potential output. The effects
stemming from the abolishment of (technical) trade restric-
tions will be more sustained. The removal of such barriers as
well as the adoption of the country-of-origin principle for
the value-added tax is also a precondition for scrapping phy-
sical barriers. The effects may be comparable to those of the
abolishment of tariffs within the EEC at the end of the fif-
ties and in the sixties. Trade will not only be stimulated by
the mere elimination of restrictions but also by the increase
in certainty about the rules governing trade. An indicator of
the legal uncertainty resulting from the increased use of non-
tariff trade restrictions and regulations is the number of law
suits in the European Court. 1974 there were 30 law suits ac-
cording to Article 169 EEC Treaty, 1985 the number was 503. As
to market entry in services, there were 12 complaints in 1976
and 83 in 1985 (Grimm, Schatz, Trapp, 1989b).
The elimination of technical barriers will reduce production
costs as products have no longer to be adjusted to different
national standards. Furthermore, as the market increases
companies can exploit economies of scale. This effect may be
important for certain industries, however, the average gains
to be realized from establishing larger production units are
probably rather small. There is no evidence that companies in
the U.S., the biggest single market so far, are systematically
more competitive than European or Japanese companies. The real
advantage of the single market is not that firms by getting
bigger can reduce unit costs but that consumers are confronted
with more choices. This intensifies competition between com-
panies and forces them to strive for process and product in-
novations . Thus, the removal of trade barriers should result
in a significant increase in the growth of potential output.
According to a study prepared for the Commission, the Cecchini
Report, the creation of the single market would increase the
growth rate of real GNP by 4.5 percentage points over a period10
of six years. Employment would rise by 1.8 million and the
inflation rate would be reduced by 6 percentage points (Cec-
chini, 1988). Thereafter annual GNP growth would be .7 per-
centage points higher than otherwise.
In its assessment of the growth effects the study stresses the
freeing of resources for the production of consumer and in-
vestment goods, the exploitation of economies of scale, and
the realization of a more efficient use of resources. The es-
timates of the impact of removing trade restrictions on pro-
duction and employment are based on company surveys. But in-
dividual companies can only quantify the accounting costs of
regulations, they do not possess any information on the syner-
getic effects that are likely to occur when the markets are
opened up (Grimm, Schatz, Trapp, 1989b). Thus, the effects of
deregulation and of abolishing non-tariff trade barriers are
probably underestimated. This was also the case when major
parts of the economy were liberalized in Germany after World
War II and when the EEC was founded in 1957.
5. Steps Toward the Single Market
Looking ahead to the prospective benefits of the creation of
the single European market one may wonder why it took the EC-
countries such a long time to undertake steps to complete the
single market. However, looking back at the long history of
governments intervening heavily to protect domestic industries
by using regulations, subsidies, and trade restrictions the
question should be rephrased: What makes the same governments
now abolish such policies and open their borders to foreign
competition? One reason is the obvious failure of protection-
ist policies. In spite of (or better: because of) the protec-
tion and support given to various industries the European
economies have lost competitiveness in many key areas; in-
dustrial policies have become extremely expensive. While the11
share of EC-exports (excluding intra-EC-exports) in world ex-
port stagnated, import penetration increased significantly.
Furthermore, the experience in the United States and also in
the United Kingdom has shown that deregulation is effective in
improving competitiveness and creating additional jobs. Still,
many governments have chosen to ignore this evidence, since
their constituencies (i.e., lobbies) are against abolishing
trade restrictions, regulations, and subsidies from which they
profit. However, by putting deregulation and liberalization on
an EC-wide level and by framing it as an European response to
global challenges the initiative has gained momentum.
The Single European Act contains a number of elements that
have greatly contributed to facilitating the completion of the
single market. The most important point is a change in the
integration strategy: harmonization of regulations is only
required for the essential standards, the remaining technical
barriers to trade are to be removed by mutual recognition of
national norms and standards. This implies a widespread adop-
tion of the country-of-origin principle as an integration stra-
tegy. The second point concerns the decision-making process in
the council. Until 1987 a unanimous vote was required for all
policy decisions. In the Single European Act, the governments
of the member countries agreed that the decisions concerning
the creation and functioning of the single market can be
passed by qualified majority (with the exception of decisions
affecting labor, competition, and taxes). Finally, the Act
gave the European Parliament a greater role in the legislative
process.
6. Shaping the Single Market - Competition Versus
Harmoni zation
The change in the integration strategy had been initiated by
the European Court. In the Cassis-de-Dijon decision the Court
had pronounced that a good that is produced and sold in a mem-11
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the European Court. In the Cassis-de-Dijon decision the Court
had pronounced that a good that is produced and sold in a mem-12
ber country in conformity with the standards prevailing in
that country may be sold without change in any other EC-coun-
try (country-of-origin principle). According to the White Pa-
per of the Commission this rule is to be applied to services
and to the activity of companies as well. Consequently, pro-
ducers and consumers could choose between a greater variety of
production possibilities and goods, in those areas, in which
regulations have not been harmonized. There would be competi-
tion between national standards and regulations. In the longer
run, those standards would prevail that allow companies to
produce at the lowest costs while maintaining the essential
standards required for the production and the quality of the
products. Thus, instead of being exclusively based on insti-
tutional ex-ante harmonization, the single market would partly
emerge from a spontaneous process of integration (Giersch,
1988).
The European Council has subscribed to the country-of-origin
principle. But it is easy to predict that agreeing on the
principle and applying it to individual industries and markets
is quite a different thing. Imagine a French retailer, who
serves his customers in France in the evenings or on weekends,
intends to produce his services in Germany in the same way.
According to the country-of-origin principle, the regulations
governing the supply of retailer services in France should be
applicable in Germany too. This would be a powerful instrument
to undermine restrictive German laws on shop-opening hours.
More likely, however, the German government will try to block
the strict application of the country-of-origin principle
because, in the face of furious protests of German trade
unions, it can convincingly argue that social peace is at
stake in Germany. Furthermore, the European Commission, which
has not fully converted to the new principle, will probably
support the German government and stress the need for a har-
monization of shop opening hours that is "socially acceptable"
in all member countries. Anyhow, the Single European Act may13
help that the country-of-origin principle will prevail at
least in some areas. In Article 100a, by which the Treaty of
Rome was supplemented, it is stated that in those areas for
which a harmonization of laws and regulations has not been
carried out until the end of 1992 a mutual acceptance of na-
tional regulations will take place.
First steps to open up and to deregulate the European economy
have already been undertaken, e.g. in the financial sector and
in trading. If the single market would be completed as out-
lined in the White Paper, Europe were to experience a Schumpe-
terian event (Miller, 1988). This way of completing the single
market could be viewed as an institutional innovation (Sie-
bert, 1989), allowing the European economies to enjoy faster
growth, and providing a sustained stimulus to the world econ-
omy. However, there are still some question marks whether de-
control and open markets will eventually be the dominant fea-
tures of Europe after 1992. It should be noted that
- the Single European Act contains many elements that call for
a European policy cartel, e.g. in fiscal and in monetary
policy,
- the discussion of the social dimension in the single market
includes a strong tendency to harmonize regulations or to
reduce the scope for decontrol to measures that are socially
acceptable,
- there is a pressure to establish higher and more comprehen-
sive barriers to outside competitors, while internal bar-
riers are removed, or to require reciprocal action if out-
side competitors are to be allowed to take part in the bene-
fits of the single market.14
7. Economic and Monetary Union - How Essential for the
Single Market?
At its meeting in Hanover in June 1988, the European Council
restated that "in adopting the Single Act, the Member States
of the community confirmed the objective of progressive reali-
zation of economic and monetary union." To that end, the so-
called Delors Committee has submitted its Report on Economic
and Monetary Union in the European Communities. The report
rests on the contention that the single European market
increases interdependence and, thus, necessitates closer
cooperation in macroeconomic policies (monetary and fiscal
policy), competition policy as well as in regional and struc-
tural policies. In defining the monetary union the report
reiterates the three basic elements already mentioned in the
1970 Werner Report (Committee for the Study of Economic and
Monetary Union, 1989):
- assurance of total and irreversible convertibility of cur-
rencies ,
- complete liberalization of capital transaction and full in-
tegration of banking and other financial markets, and
- the elimination of margins of fluctuations and the irrevo-
cable locking of exchange rate parities.
Noting that the first two requirements are included in the
single market program, the Delors-Report proposes a three-step
plan to achieve a monetary union. In the first stage, starting
on July 1, 1990, cooperation in economic and monetary policy
between the twelve member countries and between the Council of
Finance Ministers and the Council of Governors should be in-
tensified. For this purpose all EC-countries should take part
in the European Monetary System. Furthermore, consideration
should be given to extending the scope of central banks' auto-
nomy.15
No dates are suggested for the beginning of the next two
steps. In the second step, member countries should transfer
some competences in monetary policy to a European System of
Central Banks to start the initial phase of collective deci-
sion making. Exchange rate realignments would still be pos-
sible but should be undertaken only if the costs of applying
other adjustment mechanisms are excessive. In the final step,
exchange rates would be irrevocably fixed. A joint EC-currency
substituting national currencies would be introduced by con-
verting the ECU-basket currency into real money. In fiscal
policy, there should be mandatory cooperation to avoid imba-
lances .
The introduction of a single currency is not strictly neces-
sary for the creation of a monetary union, however, it is in-
tended to "demonstrate the irreversibility of the move to mo-
netary union." Beyond that it is also expected to yield eco-
nomic benefits; the adoption of a single currency would faci-
litate the monetary management of the community and it would
avoid the transaction costs involved in using different cur-
rencies. In addition, the irrevocable fixing of parities would
eliminate the exchange rate risk between member countries.
These benefits have to be weighed against the costs of re-
nouncing the circulation of different national currencies and
the possibility of exchange rate adjustments. According to the
single market program, capital markets in eight member coun-
tries will be fully liberalized until July 1, 1990, the re-
maining countries will follow suit. The removal of all re-
strictions on capital flows is equivalent to a mutual recog-
nition of different monetary standards. Once money users and
investors are free to open accounts, to buy securities, or to
take loans in any of the national currencies, competition will
force central banks to produce a currency with a stable pur-
chasing power. In addition to the already existing national
central banks, an independent European Central Bank could be
established. It would supply a European currency which should16
be allowed to be used without limitations in all countries as
a legal tender and have a freely floating exchange rate (Lang-
feldt, Scheide, Trapp 1989). Each country could still earn the
seigniorage of issuing a national currency, but must compete
with the new as well as with the other member country cur-
rencies. If the European currency turned out to be a better
store of value it would displace the national currencies and
yield the benefits of a single currency. This would be the
result of a spontaneous market process and there would be no
need of an ex-ante agreement on a discretionary political ac-
tion. Even if the European monetary authority succeeds in dis-
placing national currencies it must continue to behave as if
there were competition because national currencies can be re-
introduced. This check is missing for the European System of
Central Banks as proposed by the Delors Committee. Once estab-
lished it has a monopoly of issuing money. It is stated that
the System is committed to the objective of price stability
but it is also expected to support the general economic po-
licy. Furthermore, the questions of convertibility and freedom
of restrictions on capital flows is totally unsettled for the
single European currency. In a competitive monetary order mo-
netary authorities could not afford to put constraints on the
use of money. This could be different if the European currency
replaced national currencies by political act.
Most governments of the EC-member countries have a long his-
tory of controls on capital flows. In some countries only re-
cently controls have been partly abolished because administra-
tions became aware of the fact that heavily regulated national
banking industries cannot successfully participate in the ra-
pidly expanding market of financial services. Other countries
still have severe restrictions on the use of foreign cur-
rencies . In the absence of controls capital can be used more
efficiently. Therefore, capital mobility is probably more im-
portant than a single currency (Schlesinger, 1989). However,
if there were only one currency and a huge internal financial
market the government representatives running the European17
System of Central Banks might feel tempted to reimpose re-
strictions on capital flows whenever balance of payments
problems would emerge or the exchange rate would deviate from
its target zone.
The locking of exchange rates is likely to impede rather than
promote the integration process. The European Community is far
from being an optimum currency area. The elimination of
barriers will probably aggravate regional problems because
regulations that tend to shield weak industries will become
ineffective. With one currency regional problems, which will
often be problems between nations, can no longer be tackled by
exchange rate changes. Instead, wages have to decline in areas
with high unemployment or labor has to move to more attractive
locations of production. The Delors Report calls for a doub-
ling of funds and closer coordination in structural and re-
gional policies to ensure a regionally balanced growth. How-
ever, experience with national regional policies is not en-
couraging. All in all, the creation of economic and monetary
union along the lines described in the Delors Report would
imply a revival of the integration strategy that failed in the
seventies. It would be equivalent to the abandonment of the
country-of-origin principle the adoption of which has given so
much momentum to the integration process in recent years.
8. The Social Dimension
The creation of the single market implies an increase in com-
petition between different locations of production. Wage le-
vels, social security systems, and labor market regulations
are important determinants of production costs and influence
investment decisions. This has given rise to the discussion
about the social dimension of the single European market. Con-
cerns have been increasingly expressed in countries with rela-
tively high wage and social costs, like Germany, that compa-
nies will undercut local pay, working condition, and codeter-18
mination rules by transferring capacities to countries with
relatively low production costs like Spain or Portugal. Such
emigration of labor-intensive industries from high- to low-
wage countries has always taken place in the process of eco-
nomic development; it provides additional income opportunities
for countries with relatively low wage costs and forces com-
panies in advanced countries to strive for process and product
innovation. The gain of market shares of low-wage countries in
labor-intensive industries has - contrary to the contention of
some lobbyists - nothing to do with wage dumping and should
not be blocked, as has been the case, by restricting imports
and granting subsidies in high-wage countries.
Faster growth in low-income areas stimulates growth in ad-
vanced countries, too. E.g., the strong rise in GNP in Spain
and Portugal after joining the EC led to a strong expansion of
imports from Germany. If, however, companies in economies with
high wage costs increase direct investment at the expense of
investment at home and reduce domestic employment, this is a
clear indication that the overall level of domestic production
costs in relation to productivity is too high. In this case,
competitiveness can only be restored by cutting costs at home
but not by blocking competition from abroad.
If the attempt to impose relatively high standards for wages,
dismissal protection, and social benefits on an EC-wide level
were successful, regional problems would aggravate. As the
free flow of private capital to developing areas would come to
a halt, structural fonds financed by tax revenues would have
to be enlarged in order to channel official funds into those
areas. However, experience with national regional policies
suggests that this strategy tends to be counterproductive.
Administrations have no superior knowledge on investment op-
portunities and the incentives to minimize losses are lacking
because there is no personal financial responsibility.19
The EC-Commission has proposed to intensify the "social di-
alogue" in order to ensure that the single market is socially
acceptable. The consensus of what is regarded as socially ac-
ceptable generally reflects the interests of large economic
lobbies, namely employers and trade unions. Therefore, there
is the danger that market signals will be neglected and that
the dialogue results in an attempt to overcome economic rela-
tionships by political agreements. Experience in the United
States has shown that deregulation is mainly at the expense of
trade unions and management (Niskanen, 1988). If these two
groups were successful in shaping a social order in Europe
consistent with their interests, it would hamper deregulation
and reduce the potential gains, i.e. higher productivity and
improved service and supply.
9. The Fortress Europe
The European Commission stresses that the trade-creation ef-
fect of the completion of the single market will be much
stronger than the trade-diversion effect which is unavoidable
when inside barriers fall and outside barriers remain. But
many observers are afraid that the move to abolish non-tariff,
regulatory, and tax barriers to mobility and trade inside the
community may go along with steps toward more and higher bar-
riers to mobility and trade around the single market. To as-
sess this possibility it seems useful to look how trade is
arranged in another large internal market, the United States.
In the United States, barriers to imports have been imposed to
protect industries like textiles, steel, cars, agriculture and
others. Restrictions were justified by claiming that import
competition was unfair (dumping), that the loss of jobs would
create severe difficulties and social costs, and that the in-
dustry needed time to become competitive again. Similarly, the
EC and individual European countries have established barriers
to trade. The adjustment problems of ailing industries will20
probably increase significantly when the internal barriers in
Europe are removed. The Cecchini-Report even stresses that
because of the initial "adjustment shock" there is likely to
be a decline of employment in the first phase of the single
market. Under these circumstances most governments will be
happy to reserve the benefits from faster growth inside the
single market to their own industries while hoping that the
increase in growth and in competition will contribute to suf-
ficiently raise productivity in structurally weak industries.
If these expectations do not come true the introduction of
production quotas in some critical industries cannot be ruled
out. Predictably, for regionally highly concentrated indus-
tries facing fierce competition from abroad, there will be a
strong coalition between unions, employers and politicians in
favor of high barriers at the border of the single market in
order to keep other competitors out. A case in point are the
industries which are protected by import restrictions based on
Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome (Table 3). Article 115 al-
lows EC member states to restrict the flow of indirect imports
from non-member countries coming through other EC-countries.
In the eighties, on average about 120 actions have been ini-
tiated each year, while the number of actions remained stable,
their impact nonetheless increased markedly as the restric-
tions were applied for longer and longer periods of time than
before (Spinanger, 1989). Originally, Article 115 was mainly
used to restrict the import of textiles and clothing. But over
the last years it was enacted more and more to block the im-
port of other manufactures as well, e.g., in spring 1989,
France stopped the import of car radios from China and Japan
and Spain the import of small TV sets from Korea and Japan.
Theoretically, Article 115 should become meaningless when the
single market is completed as border controls between member
countries are to be eliminated. But, of course, the countries
that have used Article 115 heavily will demand a compensation.
What will be put up in place of it: quotas or voluntary export
constraints? As member countries have used trade restriction21
Table 3 - Distribution of Article 115 Actions by Product Groups
and Initiating Countries (%)
Product group/




Other industrial goods 23.7
Total (actual) 114
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Source; Spinanger, 1989.22
to very different degrees, and for different industries, they
will trade concessions to restrict imports. Those countries
that have imposed the strongest limitations on imports in
past, e.g. France, Italy and Spain, will probably press for
relatively high community-wide restrictions. Therefore, on
average, the barriers are likely to be somewhat higher and
more comprehensive than before. Attempts to limit the market
entry of third-country companies are to be expected for manu-
factures as well as for services. The proposal on "Television
without Frontiers" includes time limits for commercials and
determines that TV-stations have to ensure that the program
mainly consists of contributions from European production (the
agreement implies a 50 p.c. share of European productions,
France and Italy are demanding a 60 p.c. share).
Another argument put forward in the United States to justify
or to call for protection is that the country cannot afford to
fall behind in some key (high tech) industries. One example is
the restriction on the import of semiconductors. In Europe,
too, politicians, industrialists, and trade union leaders em-
phasize that the community must not fail in getting access to
the new technologies. Much of the enthusiasm behind the move-
ment toward an European single market even stems from the be-
lief that Europe can withstand competition from American and
Japanese companies only with a unified industrial base that
reaps economies of scale in research, production, and distri-
bution. In order to achieve more competitiveness and progress
in high tech areas, such as computers, microchips, telecommu-
nication etc., a number of extensive and expensive research
programs has been launched (Eureka, Jessi, Esprit, and the
European Air and Space Program). As these high-tech industries
are said to need time to become competitive, governments will
see a necessity to provide "temporary" protection to help "in-
fant" or "potential infant" industries to grow up (e.g. the
Airbus). The experience with previous programs is not encour-
aging; e.g., the results of subsidizing the development of
large computers or of nuclear power plants have been poor, if
not disastrous.23
Looking at the trade experience of the United States, one sa-
lient feature in the view of some European politicians is that
the U.S. succeeded in putting the Americans to work for Japa-
nese companies. As unemployment is still very high in most
countries of the EC this may appear to be an attractive per-
spective for some governments. For the time being, countries
continue to compete for jobs by granting subsidies. The com-
munity as a whole may view barriers to imports as a welcome
instrument to have non-EC producers establish production faci-
lities inside the single market. The bigger the market and the
more uncertain the future market entry is the more will impor-
ters to the single market be inclined to set up production
facilities inside the market. But for the right to produce in
the single market foreign producers will have to make conces-
sions. Goods produced by foreign companies inside the EC will
be only considered as domestic goods if the local content of
the goods is high enough. At present, the local content re-
quirement is already around 60 p.c. but, as is evidenced by
the refusal of France to accept the Nissan cars produced in
the United Kingdom as intra-EC produced cars, there is dis-
agreement on how to determine the local-content share. Fur-
thermore, permission to produce inside the single market will
only be granted when the production process includes the tech-
nically sensitive parts; i.e., a transfer of technology has to
take place. For example, for the planned production of chips
the European authorities insisted that the production process
consists not only of the assembly of chips but that it in-
cludes the sophisticated diffusion process.
Finally, it has to be taken into account that free trade is an
ideal, a Utopian state of the world. In the real world trade
restrictions abound. Because of allegedly unfair trade prac-
tices by other countries the U.S. Congress has passed the Om-
nibus Trade and Competitive Act which provides an arsenal of
instruments to restrict trade. The Community will probably
consider itself to be in a similar position. Presumably, po-24
liticians will argue that in order to cope with barriers to
market entry, which are numerous in Japan and other Southeast
Asian Countries, the EC needs some trade policy weapons to
maintain a balance of deterrence and to have something that
can be exchanged for trade concessions. Another feature of the
U.S.-trade policy recently has been its tendency toward
bilateralism, e.g. the free trade agreement with Canada and
the thrust of the Trade Act (Section 301 and Super 301). The
counterpart in EC-trade policy is the demand for reciprocity,
in particular, with respect to market entry in services.
According to the reciprocity principle, the companies of
non-member countries may only do business in the EC-market
when EC-companies can operate under equal conditions in the
non-member country's market - whatever the meaning of equal
conditions is. Whereas the country-of-origin principle is
equivalent to free trade and the principle of national treat-
ment corresponds to the notion of fair trade, reciprocity
comes close to regulated trade. Compared to the most-fa-
vored-nation clause, the application of reciprocity would mean
a severe set-back in trade policy.
10. Conclusion
On the whole, the fear of a fortress Europe can certainly not
be dismissed easily. Even inside the single market, there is -
beyond the political rhetoric - still widespread opposition to
applying the country-of-origin principle not only to goods but
to services and companies as well. The risk that competition
will be subdued by ex-ante harmonization and regulation should
not be underestimated.
But important decisions on how the single market will even-
tually look like, - internally and externally - have still to
be made. After having deregulated its own economy the British
government will hopefully not allow the community to become a25
"Europe Incorporated" with a bias toward overregulation and
excessive bureaucracy. The glass is not only half empty, it is
also half full. No one can expect that the country-of-origin
principle will be applied in its pure form. Even if it is ap-
plied partially and if its spirit survives, it will contribute
to make European markets more open and more competitive.
It should be noted, however, that the outlook for freer trade
is dimmed by another tendency. Some politicians in Europe and
the United States seem to believe that by starting an "arms
race" in trade policy others can be forced to deregulate, to
decontrol, and to open their markets. In fact, the recipe
seems to have worked in the military field. However, in trade
policy it is hard to see who will start "Perestroika". The
disastrous results of protectionism in the thirties should be
a warning and induce politicians to make more efforts in
trade-disarmament. The economic benefits of creating a single
European market or of establishing a free-trade area in North
America may be considerable but they are small compared to
benefits of freer trade in the world market.26
11. References
Boss, Alfred (1989a), The Flaw in Europe's Tax Strategy.
The Wall Street Journal, Brussels, March 30, 1989.
- - , (1989b), Steuerharmonisierung und Realisierung des
EG-Binnenmarktes. Wirtschaftsdienst 1989/V, Hamburg,
pp. 249-251.
Cecchini, Paolo, Europa '92 (1988), Der Vorteil des Binrien-
marktes, Baden-Baden 1988.
Committee on the Study of Economic and Monetary Union,
Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European
Community, mimeo, 1989.
Dicke, Hugo et al. (1987), EG-Politik auf dem Prufstand.
Wirkungen auf Wachstum und Strukturwandel in der Bun-
desrepublik. Kieler Studie Nr. 209, Kiel 1987.
- - (1989a), Was kommt wirklich? Binnenmarktordnung oder
Binnenmarkt. mimeo, Kiel 1989.
- - (1989b), Das Programm zur Vollendung des Binnenmarktes
- Versuch einer Zwischenbilanz. Kieler Arbeitspapier
Nr. 364, Kiel 1989.
Donges, Juergen B., Klaus-Werner Schatz (1986), Staatliche
Interventionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Kieler Diskussionsbeitrage Nr. 119/120, Kiel 1986.
- - (1989), 1st das Freihandelspostulat noch zeitgema/5?
Kieler Arbeitspapier Nr. 355, Kiel 1989.
- -, Klaus-Dieter Schmidt et al. (1988), Mehr Struktur-
wandel fiir Wachstum und Beschaftigung. Die deutsche
Wirtschaft im Anpassungsstau. Kieler Studie Nr. 216,
Kiel 1988.
Giersch, Herbert (1988), Der EG-Binnenmarkt als Chance und
Risiko. Kieler Diskussionsbeitrage Nr. 147, Kiel
1988.
Grimm, Doris, Klaus-Werner Schatz, Peter Trapp (1989a),
Konjunktur zwischen geldpolitischer Dampfung und
Hoffnung auf Gemeinsamen Markt, Kieler Diskussions-
beitrage Nr. 149, Kiel 1989.
- -, - - (1989b), EG 1992: Strategien, Hindernisse,
Erfolgsaussichten, Kieler Diskussionsbeitrage Nr.
151, Kiel 1989.27
Langfeldt, Enno, Joachim Scheide, Peter Trapp, The Case for
Money Supply Rules, in: Peter Bernholz (ed.), Geld
und Wahrung. Vol. 5, 2/3, Basle, May 1989, pp. 5-29.
Niskanen, William A. (1988), Economic Deregulation in the
United States: Lessons for America, Lessons for Ger-
many. Paper prepared for a Conference on The Costs
of Legislation. Sponsored by the German Legislators
Association, mimeo, Bonn 1988.
Schlesinger, Helmut (1989), Vollendung des Europaischen
Binnenmarktes 1992. Wirtschafts- und wahrungspoliti-
sche Aspekte aus deutscher Sicht. mimeo, Saarbrucken
1989.
Siebert, Horst (1989). Perspektiven zur Vollendung des
europaischen Binnenmarktes, Kieler Arbeitspapier Nr.
346, Kiel 1989.
Spinanger, Dean (1989), Building a Fortress Europe in 1992.
Some Implications of the Common Internal market for
Hong Kong and Other PACRIM-countries. PRICES-Paper
No. 1, Hong Kong 1989.